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Abstract
This paper investigates decisions about inter-temporal tradeo￿s.
The objective of the study is to explore the valuation of time itself
without tradeo￿s between time and consequences. In an experimental
study subjects made decisions about waiting time, where the time was
subject to risk. We ￿nd that subjects are risk-seeking for decisions
about time, which leads to the conclusion that waiting time is experi-
enced as a loss. Subjects in this experiment show similar choice patters
as can be seen in studies about money when losses are involved.
1 Introduction
In economic and business settings agents are often required to make decisions
about future actions in projects with delayed payo￿s. Economic research
focuses on modeling decisions with delayed streams of payo￿s. In order
to model preferences of economic agents, utility functions are derived that
are characterized by three dimensions, which are good (e.g. money), time,
and uncertainty (Andersen et al., 2008). Early work on modeling decisions
with delayed payo￿s suggests that the preferences over time and payo￿s are
separable (Samuelson, 1937). That means the utility of delayed payo￿s can
be described as a utility function of money combined with a value function
of time which can be described as U(x;t) = u(x)  v(t), with u(x) being
preferences for money and v(t) being a value function for time.
While there is a lot of work done on preferences over money with and
without uncertainty, the research on time preferences have been studied us-
ing decisions about inter-temporal tradeo￿s. After providing a short overview
of the research ￿ndings about decisions on delayed payo￿s, the focus of this
paper will be the analysis of preferences over time itself. There is an ongoing
1discussion about which functional form can best explain experimental ￿nd-
ings of decisions about delayed payo￿s. Besides the classical approach using
exponential discounting the hyperbolic discounting utility function was intro-
duced (Phleps & Pollak, 1968) and its implications discussed (Laibson, 1997)
with respect to inconsistencies in inter-temporal tradeo￿s (Strotz, 1955).
Empirical work clearly supports hyperbolic discounting in favor of expo-
nential discounting (Benzion et al., 1989; Thaler, 1981). However, inconsis-
tencies as di￿erences in discount rates between short- and long-run (Harris &
Laibson, 2001), as well as for di￿erent values of rewards (Benzion et al., 1989;
Kirby, 1997; Thaler, 1981) are still not explained by theory. Therefore, the
focus of research needs to be ￿nding new models to explain decisions about
inter-temporal tradeo￿s (Rubinstein, 2003; Rubinstein, 1988). Furthermore,
recent work has shown the importance of eliciting both, risk and time prefer-
ences to explain behavior as reported in experiments (Andersen et al., 2008).
So far, economic research focuses on deriving a function for U(x;t). This
paper, however, presents results that help to separate time preferences v(t)
from the joint function for time and money preferences. Additionally, there
seems to be a connection between risk preferences and discounting behavior
(Anderhub et al., 2001). In order to gain a more conclusive view of decisions
about delayed payo￿s, the experiment reported in this paper provides infor-
mation about decisions about time, without the link to payo￿s as used in the
work reported so far.
Furthermore, research has shown that the elicitation of discount rates
does not explain behavior in laboratories as well as more general measures
of time preferences as self-control and impulsivity (Khwaja et al., 2007).
Furthermore, the dual-self model of impulse-control explains decisions re-
ported in economic studies (Fudenberg & Levine, 2006). Additionally, recent
research brought up the importance of a model to accommodate di￿erent
levels of impatience (Bleichrodt et al., 2008). These models provide insight
into psychological processes underlying decisions where timing is involved.
In order to turn these ￿ndings into an economic model for decisions about
inter-temporal tradeo￿s, the preference for time independent of possible con-
sequences needs further investigation.
From experimental investigation economists have developed understand-
ing about the utility of money and preferences of risky choices. For money,
people tend to be risk-averse for gains and risk-seeking for losses (Tver-
sky, 1972). Additionally, an index of loss-aversion needs to be added to
explain phenomena gained in experiments about risky choices (K￿bberling &
Wakker, 2005). On the other hand, preferences have been studied where
inter-temporal tradeo￿s are involved. From empirical investigation it is
known that people tend to choose trains with risky arrival time when there
2is a possibility of gaining time (Weber & Milliman, 1997). Therefore, it is
to be expected that people view waiting time as a loss. In addition to this
knowledge about preferences over money and preferences for inter-temporal
tradeo￿s, this paper sets out to discover preferences over time without a link
to consequences. That is not the tradeo￿s between time and the utility of
the consequences is analyzed, rather is it the valuation of time itself. By
eliciting the preference structure over time, this paper helps to separate the
value function over time from the utility of money.
2 Experiment
The group of participants consisted of 25 students from the Otto-von-Guericke-
University Magdeburg from di￿erent ￿elds of study. The experiment was
conducted in a laboratory environment.
To elicit time preferences of subjects, participants were asked to choose
between two lotteries, where payo￿s were determined as waiting time. The
choice of the options is within the random lottery payo￿ mechanism (Grether
& Plott, 1979). In our experiment participants were paid a show-up fee of 6
Euros at the beginning of the experiment and told that their decisions were
determining a waiting time in the laboratory. This waiting time started after
all decisions were made and the chosen lotteries were played out. The partic-
ipants spent this time in an experimental cabin without any communication
devices or books.
The options were chosen in a form that is in line with (Holt & Laury,
2002), where Option A o￿ered less risk, but a higher sure waiting time (with
a waiting time of either 30 or 40 minutes) and Option B o￿ered a higher risk,
but the chance of a much smaller waiting time (with a waiting time of either
5 or 60 minutes). The probabilities of the favorable outcome stayed the same
for both options, but varied between .1 and 1.0 as shown in table 1. Therefore,
risk preferences for waiting time could be elicited for each participant by the
row in which option B was chosen for the ￿rst time. If that point was in row
4 or earlier the choice pattern indicates risk-seeking behavior, if it was in row
6 or later the choice pattern indicates risk-averse behavior. The risk attitude
for subjects switching to option B in row 5 cannot be identi￿ed since they
can either be slightly risk-averse, risk-neutral or slightly risk-seeking. After
the choices were made, the experimenter drew a ball from a bingo cage with
balls labeled from 1 to 10, determining which choice was selected. Then, the
lottery the participant chose for that row was realized and the waiting time
started.
3No. Option A Option B Expected value di￿erence
1 f:1;30;:9;40g f:1;5;:9;60g -15.5
2 f:2;30;:8;40g f:2;5;:8;60g -11
3 f:3;30;:7;40g f:3;5;:7;60g -6.5
4 f:4;30;:6;40g f:4;5;:6;60g -2
5 f:5;30;:5;40g f:5;5;:5;60g 2.5
6 f:6;30;:4;40g f:6;5;:4;60g 7
7 f:7;30;:3;40g f:7;5;:3;60g 11.5
8 f:8;30;:2;40g f:8;5;:2;60g 16
9 f:9;30;:1;40g f:9;5;:1;60g 20.5
10 f1:0;30;0:0;40g f1:0;5;0:0;60g 25
Table 1: Lottery choices determining waiting time
3 Results
As described in the experimental setting subjects can be sorted as risk-seeking
and risk-averse for risky choices on waiting time by looking at the ￿rst row
in which option B is chosen. In Table 1 it can be seen from the di￿erences in
expected values, that risk-seeking individuals would choose option B for the
￿rst time in row 4 or earlier, while the switching point from option A to option
B would be in row 5 or later for risk-averse subjects. The frequencies for rows
in which subjects switched to option B are reported in table 2. That means,
a subject that chooses option A in rows 1 through 3 and chooses option B
in rows 4 through 10 is noted in Table 2 in the column 4, while a subject
choosing option A in rows 1 through 4 and then switches to option B is noted
in column 5. From the expected value di￿erences in Table 1 it can be seen
that subjects listed in columns 1 through 4 are risk-seeking and subjects
listed in columns 6 through 10 are risk-averse. Subjects that are listed in
column 5 cannot be clearly identi￿ed as indicated in the section above.
One subject was excluded from analysis, because of switching from op-
tion A to B and back to A for a number of times. Assuming a standard
utility function this behavior cannot be explained by such a functional form.
Furthermore, since it is only one subject showing this behavior it can be
assumed as error.
The data set shows 27 subjects showing risk-seeking behavior while 9
subjects made choices showing risk-averse behavior. Therefore we conclude
that people show risk-seeking behavior when making decisions about time,
where the outcome is subject to risk (1%-level, Binomial-Test).
4Row of ￿rst choosing option B 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8-10
P
Frequency 1 1 6 19 4 2 2 1 36
Table 2: Frequencies of ￿rst choosing option B
4 Conclusion
The subjects show risk-seeking behavior in our experiment. Results reported
in this paper are similar as what is known from Prospect Theory (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979) for choices about money gambles involving losses. There-
fore, we conclude that subjects perceived the time spent waiting as losses.
The experiment reported here give an insight into how people value time
and how a utility function of time v(t) can be constructed. Further research
is necessary to explore how preferences over time can help explain inconsis-
tencies of existing models on inter-temporal choice. Additionally it needs
to be looked at, how time preferences are a￿ected by context. That means
if additional time can also be experiences as something positive. While the
experiment of this paper gives ￿rst hints on what a utility function of time
can look like, further research is needed to model decisions over time.
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